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Essay
Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right:
Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law
and Their Combined Economic Justification
Alex Stein*
This essay offers a new rationale for the standard of proof re-
quirements in civil trials. The civil proof doctrine, as traditionally
understood, presents two economic paradoxes. First, it focuses on accu-
racy ex post by requiring judges to reconstruct the relevant events as they
unfolded in reality, including the actual damage to the plaintiff, based on
the information available at the trial. This retroactive (ex post) accuracy
is economically inefficient. For deterrence purposes, only information that
had been available to the defendant prior to taking the litigated action (ex
ante information) matters. Moreover, accuracy ex post is an investment-
dependent opportunity rather than a static good. As such, it fosters a
secondary market for competitive adversarial investments in information,
which might adversely affect the primary market, that is, the market for
goods, services, risks, and precautions. Thus, when prospective litigants
are rationally unwilling to commit themselves to the required investments
in information, inefficiencies are bound to occur. In such cases, each party
will account for the event that he will be wrongfully defeated in the future
trial because his opponent's investment in information outscored his. This
prospect will foil transactions that are otherwise efficient and chill many
other socially beneficial activities.
Second, if the doctrine is nonetheless committed to accuracy ex post,
then it should require judges to determine the ultimate probability of the
* Visiting Professor of Law, Columbia Law School & Sylvan M. Cohen Professor of Law,
Faculty of Law, Hebrew University ofJerusalem. Comments and suggestions received from Omri Ben-
Shahar, Zohar Goshen, Tamar Kricheli, Gideon Parchomovsky, Ariel Porat, and Paul Roberts are
gratefully acknowledged.
Texas Law Review
plaintiff's case by multiplying the probabilities of the relevant entitlement,
breach, and damage. Yet, the doctrine refuses to apply the multiplication
principle and thus reduces the total number of correct verdicts, instead of
maximizing it. On these grounds, the controlling civil proof doctrine has
been criticized as economically unsound.
Under the new rationale offered by this essay, the two alleged wrongs
make a right because in combination they generate a synergetic mechanism
that aligns, to the extent feasible, the ex ante and the ex post probabilities
of transgression. This alignment is attained by the combined, but not
conjunctive, functioning of the two probabilities: the probability of the
litigated entitlement and the ex post probability of the entitlement's breach.
The entitlement's probability dominates the defendant's ex ante
information, thus adjusting the ex ante probability of breach. This
adjustment is achieved due to the visibility element, uniformly featured by
legal entitlements: under the definition of virtually any entitlement, the
entitlement must both exist and be reasonably ascertainable ex ante, that is,
at the time and in the circumstances of its breach. The ex post probability
of breach has a different function, namely, to substantiate the allegation
that the defendant has actually violated the entitlement. This combined
framework secures the appropriate alignment between the ex post and the
ex ante probabilities of breach. The plaintiff will prevail at trial only when
each probability is preponderant, that is, greater than 0.5, so prospective
defendants can safely rely on the probabilities of breach that exist ex ante.
Indeed, because the entitlement's probability functions as a misalignment-
corrector for the ex post probability of breach, and not as its conjunctive
companion, the two probabilities must not be multiplied in determining the
ultimate probability of the plaintiff's case.
This doctrinal mechanism also saves litigation expenses. The plain-
tiffs' litigation effort is substantially alleviated by the doctrinal refusal to
apply the multiplication principle. This entails greater hardship for
defendants, but they receive offsetting benefits: the doctrine allows
potential transgressors-before they become defendants-to rely on their ex
ante information. The doctrine thus encourages potential transgressors not
to incur uneconomic expenses by acquiring further information that might
become available at their subsequent trials.
This essay also supports the existing award system, under which, as
a matter of general rule, the winner takes all. Due to the existing
constraints in law enforcement, the essay prefers this system over that of
probabilistic awards. Under the existing law enforcement constraints, trial
awards function as incentives for reducing the number of both underusers
and overusers of the adjudication facility. This rationale turns trial awards
into a discrete component of civil litigation. The doctrinal mechanism
exposed in this essay consequently separates the breach-related and the
1200 [Vol. 79:1199
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damage-related proof requirements. Probability of the litigated damage
must therefore also be removed from the multiplication formula, so the
conjunction paradox disappears altogether. As demonstrated by the essay,
this rationale also necessitates an adjustment in punitive damages. The
essay therefore offers the required adjustment.
The essay establishes the above arguments by using the following
methodology: it constructs a simple Bayesian model of civil litigation, from
which it derives the ideal proof requirement (the "firstbest"); subsequently,
the essay compares that requirement with the positive law in a way that
accounts for the existing constraints in law enforcement (the "secondbest").
The essay demonstrates that the ideal proof requirement is economically
unfeasible under these constraints, which forces the legal system to develop
an adequate surrogate. This surrogate is identified by the essay as
embedded in positive law.
I. Introduction
Many people say about instant coffee "the good thing about it is that
one doesn't have to drink it." Yet, many such people drink instant coffee.
Moreover, they do that on perfectly rational grounds: ground coffee
generally tastes better than instant coffee, but it takes more time to prepare
it, so the time spared by drinking instant instead of ground coffee can be
used for promotion of other objectives that override the person's craving
for ground coffee. This explanation, however, contains a puzzle with
respect to the transitivity of such people's preferences: those objectives that
override their craving for ground coffee might also prevail over their
qualified desire for instant coffee, so they could spare even more time and
thus further promote their more important objectives if they decided not to
drink coffee at all. This puzzle is, of course, unreal. Every person who
drinks instant coffee while still preferring ground coffee is, in fact,
unwilling to sacrifice her desire for coffee for the sake of other objectives.
Any such person is determined to drink coffee, ground or instant. She is
prepared to sacrifice her desire for coffee only when its satisfaction
tangibly diverts her from the pursuit of some more important objective.
In the case of instant coffee, however, there is virtually no diversion
because the coffee is instant. Instant coffee is thus rationally consumed by
people as a cost-efficient surrogate of ground coffee. Consequently, it
becomes those people's second-best.
Law is permeated with second-bests. Typically, the law endorses
them when the first-bests are either unattainable or attainable only at a
prohibitive price. Descending from the first- to the second-best thus
facilitates many of the law's utilitarian tradeoffs. The familiar tradeoff
between the ideal deterrence system and its operational costs is, perhaps,
one of the most striking examples of that phenomenon. This tradeoff
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spawns second-bests that function as economically affordable substitutes for
the first-best principles of deterrence. These second-bests are the law's
"instant coffee."
This essay focuses on one of the principal offsprings of this important
tradeoff: the basic proof requirements for civil trials. According to its
common understanding, which can be traced back to Bentham's first prin-
ciple of procedure,' this doctrine promises to maximize the veracity of
judicial2 verdicts and thus to facilitate the implementation of the law's
substantive rules that apply to contracts, torts, and so forth. However, as
demonstrated by the contemporary scholarly literature, the doctrine fails to
deliver on that fundamental promise. First, it reduces, rather than
maximizes, the total number of correct verdicts. Second, its prescriptions
for factfinding are both costly in implementation and vastly irrelevant to
deterrence. These two fundamental flaws are embedded in the doctrine's
internal conditions. For these reasons, the doctrine has been accused of
being paradoxical or anomalous.
These are very serious accusations that entail far-reaching implications
for the law. These accusations therefore merit careful evaluation. As
explained below, arguments supporting these accusations appear
impeccable. These arguments would, indeed, be irrefutable if we were to
accept their basic premise with respect to the doctrine's underlying
ambition. According to that premise, the doctrine aims at attaining the
first-best; specifically, it aims to maximize the amount of correct verdicts,
so that the greatest possible number of wrongdoers may be exposed to
liability and the greatest possible number of faultless defendants may be
found not liable. This premise, however, is not necessarily correct. The
doctrine may well be directed towards achieving another goal that was
marked as second-best. Specifically, it may furnish the second-best
surrogate for optimal deterrence that may have been chosen for perfectly
good reasons. In such a case, the doctrine would have to be understood
differently and the accusations leveled against it would be unfounded.
Indeed, if such an understanding of the doctrine were available, then the
doctrine would adequately respond to these accusations and its alleged
paradoxes and anomalies would disappear. But is there a theory that could
justify the controlling proof doctrine as a second-best?
This essay provides a positive response to that question by offering the
required justificatory theory. This is done by examining two fundamental
1. See Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Judicial Procedure, in 2 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
1, 6 (John Bowring ed., 1838-43) ("Of the adjective branch of law, the only defensible object...
is the maximization of the execution and effect given to the substantive branch of the law."). For an
illuminating discussion of Bentham's theory of procedure, see Gerald J. Postema, The Principle of
Utility and the Law of Procedure: Bentham's Theory of Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1393 (1977).
2. The terms "judges," "judicial," etc. refer also to jurors.
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paradoxes that academic literature has detected in the evidence law. The
first is widely known as "the conjunction paradox"; the other is yet to be
labeled, so I will call it "the accuracy-maximization paradox" for reasons
that will soon become apparent.3 When examined separately, each of
those paradoxes uncovers an important truth about its underlying doctrinal
arrangement: although intuitively appealing, this arrangement is econom-
ically unsound. I will demonstrate, however, that the combined effect of
the two allegedly paradoxical doctrines is a defensible economic rationale,
previously unnoticed. Under this new rationale, ideal deterrence is
unattainable because its attainment is bound to be foiled by adjudicative and
other enforcement constraints; consequently, ideal deterrence is substituted
for by its economically attractive surrogate.
Part II describes the alleged paradoxes. The doctrine's surrogate
approach is expounded in Parts III and IV. Part V sketches the impli-
cations of the preceding discussion for the economics of punitive damages.
Economic analysis of punitive damages recommends them (inter alia) as
a tool for intensifying deterrence in cases where wrongdoers can escape
liability and are consequently underdeterred. As revealed in Part IV, the
existing evidence doctrine already contains an award-upgrading remedy for
liability-escaping cases. This implicit remedy must therefore be taken into
account in punitive damage decisions. If it is ignored, punitive damages
will exceed their optimal level. Part VI summarizes the, essay's principal
conclusions.
II. The Two Paradoxes
A. The Conjunction Paradox
Take an ordinary civil lawsuit in which the plaintiff must establish
three independent elements:
(1) entitlement-related facts (denoted E);
(2) breach-related facts (denoted B); and
(3) damage-related facts (denoted D).4
3. Perhaps I employ here a rather loose notion of "paradox," for each of the discussed doctrinal
arrangements can be held paradoxical only if one assumes, as the present essay does, that the law's
overriding objective is to maximize utility. Also: for those who would not consider the discussed
doctrinal arrangements intuitively appealing, "anomaly" or "fallacy" would be a better label. See R.M.
SAINSBURY, PARADOXES 1 (2d ed., 1995) (paradox is established only when an apparently unacceptable
conclusion is derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises).
4. My assumption that the three elements are mutually independent has been made for the sake
of convenience (in order to deal with monadic probabilities alone). Nothing would change if we treated
E, B, and D as co-dependent in their occurrence: the same paradox would emerge if we ascribed a 0.75
value to each of the dyadic probabilities-P(E B,D), P(BIE,D), and P(DIE,B).
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Under the ordinary civil proof standard, the plaintiff will win the case
if each of those elements (E, B, and D) is more probable than not.'
Evidence adduced by the plaintiff is clear and convincing, so judges infer
from it that the probability of each of the above elements equals 0.75.
Consequently, they rule for the plaintiff, a verdict that has a strong
intuitive appeal. This verdict also squarely aligns with the law of the land,
but not with the laws of probability. Under the controlling evidence
doctrine, the plaintiff is entitled to recover because his case is deemed
"more probable than not";6 under the probability laws, however, the
overall probability of the plaintiff's case is only 0.42, so his case is more
improbable than probable. The product rule for conjunctive probabilities,
also known as the multiplication principle, prescribes that P(E&B&D)=
P(E) P(B) P(D),7 which gives us 0.42. Hence, the plaintiff should lose,
not win, however counterintuitive that may appear.8  By refusing to apply
5. See, e.g., 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (5th ed., 1999)
(stating that, in most civil cases, the plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence).
6. See, e.g., ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL, Basic Jury Instruction 6.2
(2000) ("In this case each party asserting a claim or a defense has the responsibility to prove every
essential part of his contention by a 'preponderance of the evidence.'... Where more than one claim
is involved, and when more than one defense is asserted, you should consider each claim and each defe-
nse separately; but in deciding whether any fact has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
you may consider the testimony of all of the wimesses, regardless of who may have called them, and
all of the exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them. If the proof fails
to establish any essential part of a claim or contention by a preponderance of the evidence you should
find against the party making that claim or contention."); FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CIVIL, Cautionary Instruction 2.20 (1999) ("In this case, the plaintiff must prove every essential part
of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence .... In deciding whether any fact has been proven
by a preponderance of the evidence, you may, uhless otherwise instructed, consider the testimony of
all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all exhibits received in evidence, regardless
of who may have produced them. If the proof fails to establish any essential part of the plaintiff's
claim by a preponderance of the evidence, you should find for the defendant as to that claim.");
STEPHEN M. LACHS Er AL., I CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 49 (Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr.
ed., 8th ed. 1994) ("Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence all of the
facts necessary to establish: [The essential elements of [each separate] (the] claim. The essential
elements of [the] [each separate] claim [is] [are] set forth elsewhere in these instructions. In addition
to these essential elements, plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence all
of the facts necessary to establish the nature and extent of the [damages] [injuries] claimed to have been
suffered, the elements of plaintiff's damage and the amount thereof.") (brackets in original); LEON D.
LAZER ET AL., COMM'N ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ASS'N OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1A
NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 59 (3d ed. 2000) (instructing that a party needs to
"prevail on an issue on which he or she has the burden of proof") (emphasis added); see also Fisher
v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1344 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that in the usual case there must be
sufficient evidence to support a finding in plaintiff's favor on every element of the claim by a
preponderance); Four Comers Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1438 (10th Cir.
1992) (same); Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (same).
7. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND
PROBABILITY 18-19 (1989) (explaining that the multiplication principle can be used to determine the
probability of the occurrence of conjunctive events).
8. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 58-67 (1977) (explaining that,
even when a plaintiff establishes each individual element of her claim by a preponderance of the
evidence, application of the product rule may bring her case below that threshold).
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the product rule in this and similar settings, the law magnifies the number
of adjudicative errors in the long run of cases. Thus, out of 100 cases with
probabilities identical to ours, the law would produce only 42 correct
decisions and 58 erroneous verdicts. Perhaps, it seems, we should allow
the probability laws to reshape our legal intuitions and doctrines.9
Before proceeding to the next paradox, it is important to notice that
the doctrinal refusal to apply the product rule is restricted to elemental facts
alone (such as formation of a contract, its breach by the defendant, and the
ensuing damage), as opposed to intermediary facts (such as those that
specify the terms of a transaction offered by the plaintiff and those that
specify the defendant's acceptance of those terms). Elemental facts-or
"operative facts," in Hohfeld's terms' -highlight the lawsuit's
constitutive elements, as determined by the controlling substantive law.
Intermediary facts are facts that establish elemental facts: in order to
establish an elemental fact, one usually needs two or more intermediary
facts. This distinction must be kept clear because the law's probabilistic
separation is maintained only between elemental facts: if judges were to
reason mathematically, they would have to apply the product rule in
combining the probabilities of intermediary facts that are necessary for
determining an elemental fact. Informally, this requirement is already
embedded in the standard-of-proof doctrine: as famously acknowledged in
the law, an inferential chain can never be stronger than its weakest link."
B. The Accuracy-Maximization Paradox
In civil cases, the controlling level of proof is that of "preponderance
of the evidence": the party whose evidence preponderates over that of her
opponent must prevail. This has been termed "the P>0.5 rule."' 2 The
P> 0.5 rule refers to the probability of the lawsuit as determined at trial.
As such, it has been credited for its capacity to minimize the overall
amount of adjudicative errors: any other rule of decision would produce
9. See, e.g., Maya Bar-Hillel, ProbabilisticAnalysis inLegalFactfinding, 56 ACrA PSYCHOLOGIA
267 (1984); David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34
(1979); Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Probability-The Logic ofthe Law, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 457 (1993) (all favoring application of probability rules in judicial factfinding); Ferdinand
Schoeman, Cohen on Inductive Probability and the Law of Evidence, 54 PHIL. SC. 76, 80-82 (1987).
10. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING 32-35 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., Greenwood Press, 1978) (1919).
11. See IA JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 41 (Peter Tillers ed.,
1983) (explaining that the weakest link in a chain of inferences determines the strength of the
conclusion that can be drawn from those inferences).
12. For a brief restatement of this rule and its justifications, both old and contemporary, see Alex
Stein, Allocating the Burden of Proof in Sales Litigation: The Law, Its Rationale, a New Theory, And
Its Failure, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 340-43 (1996) (discussing the economic rationales for the
P>0.5 rule).
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fewer correct decisions than this rule does. Proof of this creditworthy
capacity is straightforward. By focusing on the amount, rather than on
substantive consequences, of judicial errors, the error-minimizing objective
treats every error as a fixed disutility unit (u). Consequently, there is no
difference between errors that harm defendants (false positives) and errors
that harm plaintiffs (false negatives). There is also no difference between
errors that occur in high-stakes, as opposed to low-stakes, litigation: all
errors are treated as equally bad. The utility principle therefore ordains
that a party whose case has probability P should win the case whenever
Pu > (1-P)u, that is, whenever P > 0.5.13
In short, judges will maximize the total number of correct decisions
by treating their best chances to arrive at the factually correct result as
decisive. This maximization of correct decisions indeed appears
economically beneficial: greater accuracy in factfinding gives more space
13. See David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked
Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487 (1982); David Kaye,
Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 601 (1980) (reviewing MICHAEL FINKELSTEIN,
QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY
AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978)).
When the disutilities that false positives and false negatives respectively produce are equal-that
is when P=0.5-plaintiffs should lose. This decision rle eliminates the enforcement costs that would
be incurred if plaintiffs were allowed to recover. Furthermore, by allowing plaintiffs to recover when
P=0.5, the legal system would raise the number of unmeritorious lawsuits, thus incurring greater
litigation costs. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Jury and the Risk ofNonpersuasion, 5 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 335, 337 (1971). Arguably, this decision rule is optimal also because "taking" is generally
more harmful than "not giving." This widespread perception has been justified by the diminishing
utility of income. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 604 (5th ed. 1998). But
perhaps it has to do more with the "endowment effect" that causes people to put greater value on
psychologically vested, as contrasted with psychologically unvested, rights. See Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S260 (1986),
available at http://www.jstor.org.
A different conclusion would be arrived at if the law's postulated goal were to minimize large
errors, estimated in disutility units as u-, as opposed to simply u (by plausibly invoking the diminishing-
utility-of-income assumption). On that theory, the P>0.5 rule should give way to the probability-based
recovery regime that splits the stakes in accord with the probabilities favoring each party's case. The
total amount of disutility that would be incurred under this regime would equal to:
p1(pzu)2 +p 2(p1u)2 = pIpPz2,
with p, and p2 denoting, respectively, the probabilities favoring plaintiffs' and defendants' allegations.
Under the P>0.5 rule, the total disutility amount would equal either plu2 (when defendants win) orpu 2





Probability-based recovery consequently becomes superior to the P>0.5 rule. See Neil Orloff& Jery
Stedinger, A Frameivork for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 1159 (1983). The same policy should apply in recurrent transgression cases. See infra notes 59-
60 and accompanying text.
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to the controlling substantive law. It implies that liability would be
allocated more accurately, so there would be less under-deterrence (because
more wrongdoers would be held liable) and less overdeterrence (because
fewer faultless defendants would be held liable). 4 The P>0.5 rule
therefore has a strong intuitive appeal.
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell have recently developed a model
that further emphasizes the advantages of the P>0.5 rule.15 In this
model,
g = the expected gain from a potentially harmful action
contemplated by a person;
p = probability that the person will be detected as a possible
violator of the relevant legal standard;
f = a pecuniary sanction (say, a fine that derives from the
amount of harm associated with the contemplated action) that
would be imposed on the person by the court if it finds him
liable;
C- = probability of the type-I error (false positive), that is,
probability that a nonliable defendant will be mistakenly
found liable;
E2 = probability of the type-II error (false negative), that is,
probability that a liable defendant will be mistakenly found
not liable.
For the sake of simplicity, this model assumes that the relevant actor is
neutral towards risk, a standard assumption also made by the present essay.
The model further assumes that the probability of the person's (right or
wrong) detection as a possible violator (p) is constant. This assumption is
also made for the sake of simplicity: detection errors are bound to occur,
and their actual rate has no impact on the lesson to be learned from the
model. If detection errors could be reduced, the incidence of adjudication
errors would obviously decline.
Based on the above assumptions, the person would take the contem-
plated action when
g-p(1-E2)f > - Perf.
The left side of this inequality represents the difference between the
person's gain and expected loss that arise from the harmful action. The
person's expected loss equals the fine, multiplied by the person's
probability of being detected and subsequently found liable. The right side
of the inequality is a negative sum that represents the person's initial
14. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination ofLiability, 37J.L.
& ECON. 1, 10-11 (1994) (arguing that greater accuracy produces better deterrence, which avoids
costlier law-enforcement efforts).
15. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 60-62 (2000).
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position: even if the person does not take the contemplated action, he may
be erroneously detected as a violator and subsequently found liable. This
initial loss is predicated on the existence of errors in the legal system, and
its magnitude would depend on the size of the fine and on the incidence of
both detection and judgmental false positives. The person, therefore,
would rationally take the contemplated action if its outcome improves this
initial position. Consequently, the action would be taken even if the left
side of the inequality yields a negative sum, as long as that sum is less than
pe. This implies that deterrence will be reduced not only by false
negatives, but also-albeit less trivially-by false positives.
Formally, the potentially harmful action will be taken if
g > p(1-C2)f-pef,
that is, if
g > pf(1- 2-e1 ).
This formula makes clear that both types of error ought to be reduced in
order to optimize deterrence and thereby augment social welfare. False
negatives dilute deterrence and thereby reduce social welfare by lowering
the expected fine for potential violators. False positives dilute deterrence
less trivially: they do so by eroding the difference between the fine
expected from violating the law and from not violating it. 6 For obvious
reasons, false positives also chill socially desirable activities. For example,
if courts too often fail to distinguish between negligent and careful truck-
drivers, drivers who are both rational and careful may then decide not to
drive their trucks. The lesson to be learned from this analysis is
straightforward: the optimal proof requirement is one that maximizes the
total number of correct decisions, an outcome that the P > 0.5 rule attains.
From a deeper economic perspective, however, the P> 0.5 rule seems
to be misdirected: it turns out that the law has chosen the wrong object for
maximization. Facts pertaining to a litigated event are reconstructed by
judges on the basis of evidence that becomes available at trial, that is, after
the event (ex post). By using that evidence, judges must determine the
probability of the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant violated the
litigated entitlement. Two sets of information, not one, thus appear to be
at work, and they also differ from each other: information available to
judges ex post is not the same information that was available ex ante to
prospective transgressors. The two sets of information could be aligned if
individuals had enough incentives for improving their earlier decisions by
acquiring more information (e.g., through experts or legal advice). This
would make the individuals better informed about the consequences of their
actions in terms of both harm and liability. Accuracy ex post promotes this
16. Id. This point was originally made by I.P.L. Png, Note, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in
the Presence of Judicial Error, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 101 (1986).
[Vol. 79:11991208
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objective by inducing individuals to acquire information ex ante: failure to
do so increases the risk of the individual's liability. However, as noted by
Louis Kaplow, "individuals will be induced to learn information ex ante
only if their benefits from adjusting behavior exceed the cost of the
information." 7 This condition is unlikely to be satisfied when the two
sets of information are substantially misaligned. In numerous cases, the
required alignment would be exorbitantly expensive, if not altogether
unattainable. 8 Moreover, normative postulation that individuals ought to
be induced to acquire more information ex ante does not necessarily
establish that accuracy ex post is the best inducement. A direct
requirement that individuals obtain the best information that can practicably
be obtained prior to acting in a potentially harmful way might provide a
better inducement. This direct inducement is already embedded in the
negligence doctrine and in many other liability rules that are based on
objective, rather than subjective, standards of conduct. 9
Therefore, if the law is determined to use its civil liability
mechanisms, such as torts and contracts, for setting optimal deterrence for
economic actors, then it should focus on the ex ante probability of trans-
gression as determined by a reasonable economic actor in deciding whether
to take the (subsequently) litigated action. The ex post probability of
litigated events is a poor proxy for the actor-centered probability. In such
circumstances, efforts directed at attaining accuracy ex post therefore
amount to a waste of resources. Moreover, by inducing excessive invest-
ments in the acquisition of information, accuracy ex post produces various
effects that are detrimental to efficiency.'
Take, for example, contractor C, who builds a fence for house-owner
H and guarantees that the fence will withstand bad weather. At that point
in time, C properly estimates the risk that the fence will not withstand bad
weather and fall down as amounting to 5 %. This estimation turns out to
be wrong ex post because there is something that C does not know and
cannot plausibly ascertain. A year later, the fence falls down after being
exposed to severe winds and floods. H sues C for damages, claiming that
the fence did not withstand the weather. C contends that the fence fell
down because someone must have damaged its foundations during the year.
17. Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 307, 317 (1994).
18. Id. at 330-31.
19. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at
185 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that negligence standards require individuals to seek information prior to
acting in a potentially hazardous way).
20. See Kaplow, supra note 17, at 365-66. For an earlier analysis of this issue that points to
similar and several other problems, see George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1263, 1284-88 (1985).
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At the ensuing trial, an expert witness testifies that the damage-through-
bad-weather scenario advanced by H is more likely than C's competing
scenario because in the past year the weather was particularly bad. The
expert further clarifies that H's scenario has a 60% likelihood. The court
finds this testimony credible. By applying the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard, it holds that the damage was caused by bad weather.
From the deterrence perspective, the ex post probability of the
damage-through-bad-weather scenario could not be rationally accounted for
by C at the time he built the fence. The court and the parties therefore
wasted resources in their combined efforts to determine that probability.
The court's holding in favor of H's scenario is doubtlessly more accurate
than the alternative. Such decisions would indeed produce more correct
than incorrect verdicts in the long run of cases (subject to the required
removal of the conjunction paradox). Thus, out of 100 similar cases 60
would be decided correctly and only 40 incorrectly. Yet, the court's
holding will induce no changes in behavior because any rational contractor
situated similarly to C would estimate the relevant risk as amounting to
only 5%. In accordance with this estimate, the contractor will not make
an increased investment in the construction to further prevent it from
falling down. He will not make such an investment even if he is aware of
the P>0.5 rule and its accuracy-enhancing effect. This awareness will
have no impact on the contractor's behavior because he is unaware of the
information that might become available at his trial. Under these
conditions, the contractor will rationally assume that any ex post
information will be distributed randomly across cases. He will, of course,
speculate that he may have underestimated the risk that the fence will fall
down due to bad weather. He will also speculate that the court might make
a finding to that effect, based on the information that may become available
at his trial. These speculations, however, will be treated by him as equally
plausible as speculations that go in the opposite direction. Being indifferent
between the conflicting speculations, the contractor will cancel them out.
Accordingly, he will base his decision on the information available at the
time of the decision.2'
21. Negligence regimes mitigate this problem by conditioning the defendant's liability for a
damaging occurrence on the foreseeability of that occurrence. If the occurrence was not foreseeable,
the defendant will not be liable for the damage. Judges must determine this issue on the basis of
information that was reasonably available to the defendant prior to taking the litigated action.
Information that surfaced after the event is largely irrelevant to this issue, so judges must not use it.
See, e.g., KEE'ON, supra note 19, § 31 at 170 ("The actor's conduct must be judged in the light of
the possibilities apparent to him at the time."); Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1285 (same).
This mitigation of the problem is far from sufficient because foreseeability is an indivisible legal
standard that judges apply only ex post. Application of this standard is dichotomous: a damaging
occurrence is either foreseeable or not. There is no such thing, for example, as a 5% foreseeability,
so in the present case C would have to consider whether a 5% risk to the fence makes the potential
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In the long run, this decision should also prove perfectly rational.
Contractor C must account for the possibility that the ex ante and the ex
post information may not be similar. Yet, under the given facts, there is
no reason to believe that the discrepancy between the two types of
information will be systematically slanted in a particular way. C's
assessment of the risk may turn out to have been too optimistic in some
cases and too pessimistic in others, but there is no reason to believe that
the former cases-to which the present example belongs-will outnumber
the latter. Therefore, amongst the fences constructed by C, only 5 % will
actually collapse due to bad weather, so he must not be held responsible for
more than 5 % of the fences. Holding C responsible for more than 5 % of
the fences would produce excessive deterrence.
Arguably, houseowner H should still prevail in his lawsuit against C
under the scenario that his fence belongs to the above 5 %. After all, this
scenario is more likely than not. Holding C liable would therefore not
expand his general liability for fallen fences beyond 5%. By contrast,
holding C not liable in this and similar cases would bring his liability
below 5%, in which case the deterrence would be insufficient. This
argument is correct only if one assumes that future information will not be
slanted in any particular direction. However, this is too crude an
assumption to proceed upon if one takes into account the creation and the
operation of a secondary market for trial information-a factor that I
consider in the next few paragraphs. But even if one takes this argument
as essentially correct, one must still consider the actions of the other 99
houseowners who commissioned their fences from C. Any such person
will sue C in the event that her fence falls down. Consequently, 100
lawsuits will be adjudicated; 200 experts will submit rival opinions, over
which 200 lawyers will conduct adversarial warfare; and, finally, 100
judges (and possibly 1,200 jurors) will have to work hard on identifying
the fences that collapsed due to bad weather. This massive investment in
factfinding can only be justified if it is economically necessary.
But is it really necessary from an economic point of view? Why not
devise a cheaper mechanism that would allow every houseowner-damaged
and undamaged alike-to recover from C a sum that equals, say, 5 % of the
damage fully foreseeable. Application of this standard also depends on how judges will treat the
relevant risk, an ex post factor of which C is informed only partially at the time of contemplating his
action. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992). Furthermore, the foreseeability standard applies only to the type, rather than size, of the
relevant harm, so it does not affect the quantum-of-damage decisions. See KEETON, supra note 19, at
290-93. The size of the future damage and the corresponding extent of legal liability therefore remain
unascertainable ex ante. These factors can only be approximated prior to the event. See infra notes
26-33 and accompanying text.
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houseowner's payment for the fence plus 5 % of the external damage that
a falling fence produces in the average case?' Under this framework,
proof of each houseowner's payment to C would be cheap. Determination
of the expected average damage figure might be costly, but because this
knowledge needs to be acquired only once, its costs would be spread across
many cases. This mechanism would therefore be much cheaper than con-
ventional adjudication, while its effect on deterrence would be at least as
good."
This mechanism's impact on general efficiency would, in fact, be
better than that of conventional adjudication. Accuracy ex post is
expensive: it would require substantial investments in information and other
litigation efforts on the part of both C and the houseowners. Both C and
the houseowners may be antecedently unwilling to commit themselves to
such investments. Instead of making that commitment, each party will
consider his prospect of being defeated at trial due to erroneous fact-
finding. Each party will consider it not only as a general prospect. He
will also consider the event that he will be defeated at trial because his
opponent invested more in the litigation than he did. Before entering into
each fence-building transaction, C will therefore account for his prospect
of paying more in liability damages. The houseowners, in turn, will
consider their prospect of obtaining less compensation. Aware of his
increased liability risk, C will attempt to charge more for his fences.
Aware of their risk of receiving less in money damages, the houseowners
will only be willing to pay less. Consequently, transactions that could
otherwise be efficient will not be made.2' Adjudicative accuracy would
thus produce anomalous effects that sharply contrast with its strong
intuitive appeal. Hence, it is paradoxical.
To sum up, accuracy ex post is an investment-dependent opportunity
rather than a static good. Under this standard, an individual who obtains
more evidence to credibly support her case has a greater chance to prevail
at trial. This standard therefore fosters a secondary market for competitive
adversarial investments in information. To obtain accuracy ex post,
litigants must appropriately invest in the determination of facts (both before
and during trial), and the level of their investments will depend on
competition. This creates a secondary market, that is, a market for
evidence and associated litigation efforts. This market will affect the
22. By removing further liability from C, this mechanism would induce those houseowners who
are averse towards risk to appropriately insure their fences immediately after their construction.
23. See Kaplow, supra note 17, at 330-31.
24. Theoretically, C and his clients may enter into a contractual arrangement that would replace
conventional adjudication with the mechanism I suggested. However, asymmetric information,
coordination problems, and high transaction costs would usually frustrate such arrangements,
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individuals' conduct in the primary market, that is, in the market for
goods, services, risks, and precautions. The secondary market may,
indeed, exert an adverse effect on the primary market. Thus, when
prospective litigants are rationally unwilling to commit themselves to the
required investments, inefficiencies are bound to occur. In such cases,
each party will account for the event that he will be wrongfully defeated
in the future trial because his opponent's investment in information and
other litigation efforts outscored his. This prospect will foil transactions
that are otherwise efficient and chill many other socially beneficial
activities. Take, for example, a careful truck-driver who rationally
considers his prospect of being sued for damages allegedly caused by his
negligence. If he is rationally unwilling to commit himself to a substantial
investment in information and other litigation expenses, he will have to
consider the possibility of being wrongfully defeated by a claimant whose
litigation investment outscores his. The truck-driver may consequently
decide not to drive his truck. If the truck-driver works for a company that
assumes full liability for damages associated with his negligent driving,
then the company will have to account for a similar prospect. The
company will consequently attempt to charge more for its services, which
may foil some of its transactions. Accuracy ex post is socially beneficial
only when its attainment is relatively inexpensive; but when its attainment
is inexpensive, it will not substantially differ from accuracy ex ante31
Therefore, the law should focus on accuracy ex ante rather than on
accuracy ex post.
From the same perspective, the law creates a distortion by allowing
plaintiffs to recover the whole damage26 instead of its expected average
value, as determined by using the ex ante probability of transgression. In
contemplating a potentially damaging action, an economic actor compares
her damage-avoidance costs with the expected, rather than the actual,
damage, that is, with the prospective damage, as reduced by the probability
of its (rationally estimated) non-occurrence. In the average case, this
estimation corresponds to the average level of harm associated with the
type of actions to which the contemplated action belongs. Basing the trial
award system on the expected average level of harm thus taxes the
wrongdoers for their externalities in an efficient Pigouvian way. Under
that system, damages to be paid by a wrongdoer equal a tax that would
have been imposed on him by the state if he were to pay in advance for his
25. As already mentioned, individuals should indeed be encouraged to expand the informational
base upon which they decide to act, if the expansion is relatively inexpensive.
26. By "damage" I mean any remedy that can be plausibly reduced to money, so my discussion
equally applies to specific-performance lawsuits brought under the contract law, as well as to any




harmful externalities.' In reality, some wrongdoers inflict harm that is
greater than the average; some inflict harm that goes below its average
amount (including zero harm); and others inflict the average harm. For
example, wrongdoer A may inflict damage that amounts to 10 and
wrongdoers B and C may respectively inflict damages that equal 20 and 30.
For the sake of simplicity, let it be assumed that the ex ante probability of
inflicting each damage is 0.5 and that none of the (then) potential
wrongdoers can estimate in advance the magnitude of the future damage.
In that setup, the total amount of the expected average damage equals 30.
An advance externality tax imposed on A, B, and C would divide this.
damage equally, so each of them would pay 10 (the expected average
damage in each case would equal 0.5-20= 10). None of them, therefore,
would need to be forced to pay more than 10 in money damages. This
compensation amount would be efficient because in the absence of case-
specific information that could be available ex ante, A, B, and C should not
be forced into avoiding the damage in their individual cases if the cost of
avoiding it exceeds this amount.2" Forcing them to do so would be mani-
festly inefficient. Although their individual victims have sustained damages
in the amounts of 10, 20, and 30, respectively, those victims should seek
their redress elsewhere, especially because the compensation case made out
by each of the victims is merely probable rather than certain. Ideally, a
Pigouvian tax should be collected from every potential wrongdoer, so the
total amount of the tax would allow the state to fully compensate the
victims (or to promote other socially useful policies).29 The law,
however, prefers the winner-takes-all principle over this approach. The
underlying motivation of the winner-takes-all principle is transparent: the
P>0.5 rule reputedly maximizes the number of correct verdicts; by
contrast, any probabilistic recovery rule would yield zero correct decisions,
which would frustrate the law's accuracy-maximizing objective. This
objective, however, is misdirected. An efficiency-oriented legal system
should value adjudicative accuracy only when it is instrumental to
efficiency and not for its own sake."
27. See generally William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON.
REV., June 1972, at 307 (delineating Pigou's tax criteria and identifying their operational limitations).
See also Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 647, 679-96 (2000) (comparing Pigouvian taxes with liability rules as instruments for inducing
efficient conduct).
28. Pollution cases would be different because the aggregated pollution level is a pivotal factor.
The latest pollution unit that takes the pollution above its tolerable level may consequently be treated
as more harmful than the previous pollution units. Pollution and similar cases therefore deserve special
treatment. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 412.
29. See generally Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks,
37 UCLA L. REv. 439 (1990) (advancing a corrective justice theory that imposes compensation duty
upon risk-creators even in cases in which no actual damage was inflicted and that channels the
compensation money into a general compensation fund).
30. See generally Kaplow, supra note 17 (examining the value of adjudicative accuracy from an
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In short, accuracy in the adjudicative assessment of the plaintiff's
damage is beneficial only when it aligns with the ex ante assessment of the
damage by a rational economic actor. If such an actor is unable to cost-
efficiently assess the actual damage that would result from her con-
templated action, then she will base her action on the average damage. In
such cases, spending resources on determining the plaintiff's actual damage
would be wasteful.3 ' Such cases are far from exceptional: the specifics
of the plaintiff's damage are typically unknown ex ante to his (then)
prospective injurer." The present level of investment in the adjudicative
determination of plaintiffs' damages is therefore socially wasteful. 3
The difficulties presented by the two paradoxes are probably not
insurmountable. By using different economic 4 criteria, an arguable case
can be constructed in favor of both the non-multiplication principle35 and
the P>0.5 rule.36 This essay pursues a different strategy. It accepts the
normative criteria that denounce each of these evidentiary arrangements
individually but argues that the arrangements should be examined jointly.
Accordingly, this essay evaluates the combined effect of the two
evidentiary arrangements by using these normative criteria as a frame of
reference. The motivation behind this endeavor must now be apparent: the
P>0.5 rule reputedly aims to maximize accuracy, an objective that the
non-multiplication principle systematically frustrates. It is therefore
economic perspective).
31. Id. at 313-16.
32. See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy in Adjudication, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 1, 4 (1998). In contract law, the prospective injurer's antecedent
knowledge can be expanded by using penalty-default rules: arguably, the limitation of liability famously
set in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), is one such rule. See Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87 (1989).
33. See Kaplow, supra note 32, at 4.
34. For non-economic justifications of the doctrine's suppression of the multiplication principle,
see Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOzO L. REv. 373, 409-20 (1991)
(justifying the suppression with the demand that each party produce a single coherent account of the
events, which precludes defendants from relying on disjunctive scenarios that are mutually inconsistent);
Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 279, 336-38 (1996) (justifying
the suppression by equality between plaintiffs and defendants).
35. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof,
66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 450-54 (1986); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1512-14 (1999) (all justifying the suppression of the multiplication
principle using reasons consistent with utility); Alex Stein, An Essay on Uncertainty and Fact-Finding
in Civil Litigation, with Special Reference to Contract Cases, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 311 n.27
(1998); see also Saul Levmore, Conjunction andAggregation (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the Texas Law Review) (arguing that group decisionmaking by jurors heightens the standard proof
requirement to a level that justifies suppression of the multiplication principle).
36. See, e.g., James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in
Civil Litigation, 18 TULSA L.J. 79 (1982) (justifying the P>0.5 rule on both economic and equality-
based grounds); Stein, supra note 34, at 333-36 (same).
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possible that the law suffers from schizophrenia. Alternatively, the
ostensibly bizarre interaction between the two doctrines may, after all,
produce economically defensible outcomes. The story unfolded by this
essay has a happy end: in what follows, I will demonstrate that the second
possibility is more plausible than the first.
III. The First-Best Proof Requirement
This part of the essay elicits the first-best proof requirement from the
optimal liability standard, already identified in Part II. This is done by
using a simple Bayesian probability model. Part IV compares the resulting
proof requirement with the combined effect of the non-multiplication
principle and the P>0.5 rule. This discussion develops a defensible
economic rationale for the two ostensibly paradoxical arrangements. The
significance of this endeavor is straightforward: it is important to know
whether the existing proof requirements require reform. Making adjust-
ments in legal proof requirements is basically costless, so any improvement
in efficiency that could thereby be attained would be attained for free."
In a paradigmatic civil trial, the following probabilities are at work:
(1) probability of the litigated entitlement;
(2) probability of the entitlement's breach as a potential cause of the
litigated damage; and
(3) probability of the litigated damage as resulting from the
entitlement's breach.
Under the normative criteria set forth in Part II, each of those probabilities
is an ex ante probability, reconstructed by judges on the basis of informa-
tion that was cost-efficiently available to the defendant prior to her
embarkment on the litigated action. Also: damage focused upon by this
model is the average damage figure, rather than the damage actually sus-
tained by plaintiffs. As already explained, damages actually sustained are
usually not ascertainable ex ante at a cost that prospective injurers can
reasonably bear. The actual (ex post) damage figure thus becomes largely
irrelevant for deterrence. Defendants will consequently be held liable for
the risk engendered by their actions. From the deterrence perspective, any
person externalizing risk should assume liability even when he ultimately
causes no damage to another person. This precept, however, belongs only
to the ideal-type model, isolated, for methodological reasons, from the
existing drawbacks in law enforcement that I consider later in the essay.
The existing enforcement constraints, dealt with in Part IV, generally
prevent imposition of liability for bare risk. Finally, my discussion
37. See Kaplow, supra note 17, at 358-59.
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proceeds on the standard assumption that prospective injurers and other
relevant actors are risk-neutral.
The plaintiff's holding of the litigated entitlement is not factually
dependent on the entitlement's breach and the ensuing damage. The
entitlement's probability is therefore denoted as P(E). The entitlement's
breach depends on the entitlement's existence, so probability of breach is
dyadic. This probability is accordingly denoted as P(B 1 E). The litigated
damage depends on the existence of the entitlement and on the causally
relevant breach. Probability that this damage will be38 sustained by the
plaintiff is thus denoted as P(D I E,B). The magnitude of the plaintiff's
average damage is marked as d.
Using the Bayes Rule, we can now formulate the amount of the
defendant's liability that would be optimal under our normative criteria.
First, this amount equals
P(E)-P(B I E)-P(D I E,B).d. (1)
Second, legal rules that determine entitlements and corresponding
breaches presuppose that the combination of the two is ordinarily harmful.
Any other assumption would make those rules economically redundant (at
best). Consequently, as a matter of legal standard, we are entitled to
assume that some damage is ordinarily associated with the relevant entitle-
ment and its breach. Because the magnitude of the actual damage is
unknown prior to its infliction, we are also entitled to assume that it equals
the average damage. If so, because we want to focus precisely on the
average level of harm, we can make an important simplifying assumption:
P(D 1 E,B) = 1. Making this assumption would not be possible if we were
to focus on the actual, rather than average (and consequently standard)
level of harm. The optimal liability amount thus transforms into
P(E) -P(B I E) -d. (2)
Let us now have a close look at P(B I E) (probability of breach, given
the entitlement). This probability equals P(B).P(E I B)IP(E).39 In other
words, it equals the prior probability of breach multiplied by the relevancy
quotient;' the latter is determined by the probability of the entitlement,
38. Future tense is employed here in order to emphasize the forward-looking character of the
liability standard.
39. Under the Bayesian "inversion theorem," this derivation is straightforward:
P(E&B)=P(E).P(BIE)=P(B).P(EIB); hence, P(B[E)=P(B).P(EIB)/P(E). See WILLIAM KNEALE,
PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION 127-32 (1949).
40. See RICHARD JEFFREY, PROBABILITY AND THE ART OF JUDGMENT 109 (1992). More often,
this quotient carries the name of "likelihood ratio." See BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A. VIGNAUX,
INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 16-20 (1995).
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given breach, divided by the general probability of the entitlement. Note
that in this formulation, P(B) is a probability of breach unupdated by the
relevancy quotient P(E B)/P(E). Evidence pertaining to both breach and
the underlying entitlement will, however, be considered in determining
P(B), so this probability will be affected by the entitlement-related evidence
to the extent relevant to the prospect of breach. In determining P(B), the
prospective injurer must therefore ask herself the following question about
her contemplated action: How likely is it that the action belongs to the
category of actions that inflict the damage protected against by the relevant
entitlement? The same question must be addressed by a judge who
subsequently steps into the injurer's shoes. As will soon become clear,
P(B) is a pivotal factor in my analysis. Its features are important and I
allude to them later in the essay.
My formulation of the optimal liability amount can be simplified
further: P(E I B)= 1. Indeed, it is certain that an entitlement must exist
whenever its breach occurs, so that P(B I E) =P(B)/P(E). Incidentally, this
formulation gives us an interesting insight: the greater the general
probability of the litigated entitlement, the lesser the impact of the
entitlement-related evidence on the posterior probability of breach. For
example, when the entitlement is certain, it becomes logically irrelevant to
the issue of breach: when P(E) = 1, the prior probability of breach remains
unmodified. When the entitlement is recurrent, it transforms the prior
probability of breach into an only slightly higher posterior probability. But
when the entitlement is rare and thus has a relatively low probability of
occurrence and detection, it raises the posterior probability of breach quite
substantially. This has an intuitive explanation: breaches are avoided more
easily and more often when entitlements are more recurrent and conse-
quently more familiar and provable. Breach of a rare and correspondingly
less familiar entitlement is usually more onerous to avoid and more
tempting to commit. Acquisition of information pertaining to a non-
recurrent entitlement is, indeed, costlier than with standard entitlements.
The relative frequency of transgressions thus clearly depends on the
informational (and other) costs of avoiding those transgressions. It should
also be noted that because P(B 1E) < 1, P(B) can never be greater than P(E).
Empirically, P(E) is always greater than P(B): legal entitlements are more
recurrent than their respective breaches.
This point is of some importance to the discussion taking place in Part
IV, and I will return to it there.4' Here, we focus on a different issue:
our formulation of the optimal proof standard is yet to be completed. By
substituting P(B I E) with P(B)/P(E) in formula (2), we receive
41. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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P(B)-d (3)
as representing the optimal liability amount. Correspondingly, the
controlling proof requirement (to be employed as a damage award quotient)
would be any value of P(B).
The resulting proof requirement thus features three economically
attractive factors:
(1) The ex ante probability of breach, P(B), is a function of the
prospective injurer's rational response to the question "How
likely is it that my contemplated action belongs to the category of
actions that inflict the damage protected against by the relevant
entitlement?";
(2) d is the average damage associated ex ante with the contemplated
action, not the damage actually incurred ex post;
(3) P(B)-d is the expected average damage that sets the optimal level
of precaution for prospective injurers.
This combination of the ex ante probability of breach and the average
damage is obviously attractive: it generates optimal deterrence at minimal
informational costs and precludes excessive investment in adjudicative
accuracy.
This outcome is remarkable for two additional reasons. First, it
requires judges to determine a non-conjunctive monadic probability of
breach alone. The multiplication principle consequently does not apply.
This important refinement is plainly necessary for maintaining the proper
deterrence standard. The refinement is not merely formal: it has to do
with the functional significance of the elemental facts. Deterrence would
go far below the desired level if elemental-fact probabilities (all below 1)
were to be multiplied by each other. Second, consonantly with exempting
plaintiffs from establishing damages personally sustained, this formulation
imposes no restrictions upon locus standi. Apparently, a non-damaged
plaintiff can come to court and recover damages in the name of deterrence.
This is a well-familiar problem of all deterrence-driven arrangements: such
arrangements, as affecting relevant individuals, are concerned primarily
with imposing duties, not with conferring entitlements. In principle,
therefore, violations of deterrence-driven duties must be prosecuted by the
state. The state must collect a Pigouvian tax equal to the amount of P(B)-d
from any person who externalizes risk. Liable defendants would
consequently pay the trial awards to the state (in the form of taxes or fines)
rather than to the actual victims of violations.4' If so, then why not allow
any plaintiff to sue any defendant on behalf of the state?
42. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 209.
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This familiar problem has a familiar solution. Any deterrence system
must be supplemented by an efficient enforcement mechanism that will
make the system work. The state-prosecution mechanism is manifestly
inefficient for remedying contract, tort, and similar violations: costs
involved in searching for and prosecuting such violations are enormous.
Thus, when a person externalizes risk, the risk is often invisible until it
materializes into a tangible damage. The state cannot therefore exercise
efficient control over impositions of bare risk. The state is also unable to
police many, if not most, damaging occurrences. The state-prosecution
mechanism is consequently applied only in special regulatory areas, such
as criminal law, that involve particularly harmful (and therefore regulated)
activities. As a result of this enforcement constraint, contract, tort, and
similar violations are prosecuted by self-interested individuals upon whom
the state has conferred a license to sue. This privatization would be
doomed to failure if the licensed individuals had no incentives to sue.
Therefore, by subsidizing adjudication and by allowing such individuals to
recover for their damages, the state provides them a sufficient incentive to
sue.43 Furthermore, by giving the license to sue only to those individuals
who claim to have sustained personal damages, the state fosters zealous
advocacy that enhances the integrity of adjudication through incentives to
gather more information and to appeal against wrong decisions.' These
enforcement-related factors must be accounted for in devising liability
principles that depend on adjudication. The P(B).d principle must
therefore be treated as a substantive economic ideal that would have to be
adjusted and thereby compromised in order to accommodate enforcement
and other real-life constraints. The need to provide plaintiffs with the right
incentives to sue is one of those constraints. Other constraints derive from
the ex post character of adjudication. Adjudication always follows, rather
than precedes, the litigated event. Facts necessary for adjudication are
therefore always reconstructed ex post. Determination of the ex ante
probability of transgression thus becomes costly. Furthermore, in a
privatized litigation, private facts are easier to prove than social facts. The
plaintiff's private damage is, therefore, generally easier to establish than
the average damage figure. The legal system's resort to the second-best
consequently becomes inevitable.
With these conclusions in mind, I will now compare the normative
with the positive: the optimal and the existing proof requirements will now
be measured against each other. This comparison reveals that the legal
43. From that perspective, "private law," as conventionally understood, should thus be perceived
as a privatized public law.
44. See Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Advocates, 107 J. POLIT. ECON. 1 (1999) (analyzing
the social benefits that zealous advocacy provides).
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system employs the existing proof requirement as an economically justified
surrogate for the optimal requirement. The existing proof requirement is
consequently justified as an economically necessary second-best.
IV. The Second-Best: Justifying the Existing Proof Requirement
Under existing doctrine, a lawsuit will succeed if each of its following
three elements is more probable than not:
(1) P(E) = probability of the litigated entitlement;
(2) P*(B) = probability of the entitlement's breach as a potential
cause of the litigated damage; and
(3) P(D) = probability of the litigated damage as resulting from the
entitlement's breach.
Within this framework, P*(B) is the ex post probability of breach that must
be determined by judges on the evidence presented at trial. This prob-
ability is marked with an asterisk in order to be distinguished from the ex
ante probability of breach P(B).
The doctrinal and the optimal proof requirements are similar in one
important respect: both of them do not apply the product rule. Under both
requirements, probabilities of the lawsuit's elemental facts need not be
multiplied. If the product rule were to apply, it would seriously undercut
deterrence by reducing the liability amount anticipated by prospective
transgressors. This similarity between the two proof requirements is,
however, only the beginning of the story because the requirements also
differ from each other in four important respects. Specifically,
(1) P(B) and P*(B) rest upon different informational platforms (ex
ante and ex post) and are consequently misaligned;
(2) Under the doctrinal requirement, both P(E) and P(D) must be
more probable than not, in addition to. P*(B), whereas under the
optimal requirement, P(B) is the only material probability;
(3) The optimal requirement favors probabilistic recovery for
expected damages, whereas the doctrinal requirement follows the
winner-takes-all principle;
(4) The optimal requirement averages the litigated damage and
thereby saves resources associated with ascertaining the actual
damage in each case, whereas the doctrinal requirement insists
upon proof of the actual damage.
Differences (1) and (2) both relate to the proof of the litigated breach,
while differences (3) and (4) pertain to the litigated award and its
appropriate amount. The doctrinal P(D)>0.5 requirement must therefore
be understood as part of difference (3). This splits our discussion into two
parts: we must compare the positive and the normative sets of breach
related and award-related requirements. Thus we must first compare P(B)
and the combination of P*(B) and P(E); subsequently, we must compare
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the positive and the normative award standards. This distinction is not
merely analytical. We have already observed that the optimal award ideal
cannot be implemented under the existing enforcement constraints. This
observation requires us to treat the award-related requirements as a separate
issue. For this reason, we can already see why P(D) must not be pro-
cessed by the product rule.
A. Proof of Breach: Aligning the Ex Post and the Ex Ante Probabilities
As already explained, P(B) and P*(B) rest upon different informational
bases (ex ante and ex post) that may overlap each other only occasionally.
Those probabilities are consequently misaligned. Technically, the two
probabilities are misaligned even when P*(B) equals P(B) because they
stand on different informational platforms.4" This problem is immanent
to adjudication. Because adjudication always occurs after the litigated
event, it can secure only an imperfect alignment between P*(B) and P(B).
The degree of the alignment's perfection depends, of course, on the
resources expended on adjudication. Those resources must not exceed the
optimal level, and it is transparent that trials attempting to perfectly
reconstruct P(B) would violate this precept (if they would ever succeed).
The law must therefore look for an inexpensive way of aligning the two
probabilities.
45. By adopting Keynes's terminology, we can also observe here that uncertain reasoning has two
separate dimensions, "probability" and "weight," neither of which may be neglected. As explained
by Keynes,
As the relevant evidence at our disposal increases, the magnitude of the probability
of the argument may either decrease or increase, according as the new knowledge
strengthens the unfavourable or the favourable evidence; but something seems to have
increased in either case,-we have a more substantial basis upon which to rest our
conclusion. I express this by saying that an accession of new evidence increases the
weight of an argument. New evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of an
argument, but it will always increase its "weight."
[W]eight, to speak metaphorically, measures the sum of the favourable and unfavourable
evidence . . . probability measures the difference.
JOHN M. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 71, 71, 77 (Harper & Row 1962) (1921) (emphasis
in original).
This issue was further developed by L. Jonathan Cohen in 7velve Questions About Keynes's
Concept of Weight, 37 BRIT. J. PHIL. Sct. 263 (1986). For its implications on judicial factfinding, see
L. Jonathan Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, 66 B.U. L. REv. 635 (1986);
D. H. Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand ProofBeyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 66
B.U. L. REv. 657 (1986); Stein, supra note 34, at 296-322; and Stein, supra note 35, at 304-15. The
probability-weight distinction also attracted Charles Peirce's attention. He wrote that "to express the
proper state of belief, not one number but two are requisite, the first depending on the inferred
probability, the second on the amount of knowledge on which that probability is based." Charles
Hartshorne & Paul Weiss (eds.), 2 COLLECTED ESSAYS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 421 (1934)
(emphasis in original). Louis Kaplow made an essentially similar distinction by separating burden of
proof from accuracy. See Kaplow, supra note 17, at 356-58.
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This task is achieved with the help of the P(E) >0.5 requirement.
This requirement focuses upon probability of the litigated entitlement that
does not combine with P*(B) in order to form a joint probability product
P*(B)'P(EIB). That probability is nevertheless necessary for delivering
a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. Why is it so?
An economically plausible answer to this question is that P(E)
functions as a tool for aligning P*(B) and P(B). Legal entitlements almost
uniformly feature the visibility element: under the definition of virtually any
entitlement, information about its existence is reasonably available to
potential violators. This element permeates the whole body of private law.
It is embedded in the publicity requirements that attach to property
rights,' in the mutual disclosure requirements that attach to contractual
entitlements,47 and in the duty of care requirement as limiting liability in
torts." Therefore, by establishing P(E) as more probable than not, the
plaintiff also establishes that the litigated entitlement was reasonably
ascertainable at the time and in the circumstances of its breach. When
P*(B) is similarly established, the plaintiff's combined proof implies (on
a balance of probabilities) that the entitlement was breached in circum-
stances that made it reasonably ascertainable ex ante. Specifically, the
plaintiff's proof entails that the defendant knew (or should have known)
about the plaintiff's entitlement at the time he violated it. Because the
defendant's action falls into the violation category, the defendant-who
knew (or should have known) about the violated entitlement-was also
aware (or should have been aware) of the action's transgressing potential.
The key question therefore is whether the entitlement-as defined by
the controlling substantive law-extends to cases in which the ex ante
probability of breach amounts to what it does in the case at hand. If the
answer is negative, then the entitlement is not established under its own
definition, so the defendant prevails. If the answer is positive, then the
entitlement's probability should acquire a preemptive status. Because the
ex ante probability of breach does not exonerate the transgressor under the
entitlement's conditions, this probability becomes immaterial. The
entitlement's probability will thus dominate the ex ante probability of
46. See, e.g., Jason S. Johnston, Legal Formalities, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAvE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 524-27 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
47. See, e.g., Avery W. Katz, Contract Formation and Interpretation, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 425, 429-30 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
48. Strict liability is not really an exception to this observation, as there are virtually no cases in
which a reasonably unascertainable entitlement has received strict liability protection. Strict liability
is generally imposed in connection with unusual and abnormal dangers over which potential wrongdoers
exercise control. See KEETON, supra note 19, at 537, 545-59. The resulting entitlements are
consequently ascertainable by potential wrongdoers. Duties of care that judges impose by applying the
negligence standard are not unexceptionably visible ex ante. The evidence doctrine, however, should
take no blame for such deviations.
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breach as an incentive for potential transgressors. Aware of the
entitlement's nature and probability, a potential transgressor must introduce
an appropriate adjustment in his ex ante probability of breach. This
adjustment will substitute any initial level of his ex ante probability of
breach with the level of the entitlement's probability. Hence, even when
the defendant's alleged act of transgression is determined ex post as more
probable than not, the plaintiff will not prevail at the trial. The plaintiff
will prevail only if the entitlement's probability-that is, the upgraded ex
ante probability of breach-is also preponderantly probable. The plaintiff's
breach-allegation can therefore be properly established by any evidential
means, including those that became known only after the event. This
entitlement-focused reasoning aligns P*(B) and P(B) with the maximal
feasibility that can be attained ex post without incurring exorbitant
adjudication costs.
By employing P(E) as a probability-aligning tool that brings P*(B) and
P(B) closer to each other, the law also removes it from the standard
multiplication formula for conjunctive probabilities. This removal is
justified by the law's deterrence policy. In accordance with that policy, the
law is primarily interested in the ex ante probability of breach; and because
this probability cannot be determined at trial at an affordable cost, the law
substitutes for it a suitable surrogate. Under this framework, P(E) serves
as a misalignment-corrector for P*(B), not as its conjunctive companion.49
To make things less abstract, let us now return to my houseowner-
contractor hypothetical.5 0 In that hypothetical, the ex post probability of
H's claim that the fence collapsed due to severe winds and floods amounts
to 0.6. Antecedently, the risk of this damage amounted to 0.05. This
setup unfolds into two different scenarios, depending on the exact nature
of C's liability towards H. If C gave H an unqualified warranty that the
fence would not fall down due to bad weather, the pivotal issue would then
be C's refusal to compensate H. If the fence was indeed destroyed by
winds and floods, this refusal would constitute a breach of the warranty.
The ex ante probability of this breach must be determined only after the
fence fell down. From that point in time and onwards, the ex ante and the
ex post probabilities of the breach overlapped each other. This alignment
occurs because the two probabilities have a common evidential base: after
the fence's collapse, evidence supporting H's claim was available to both
parties not only at trial, but also before trial.
49. As mentioned earlier, P(E) is always greater than P(B) or P*(B) (legal entitlements exist more
frequently than breaches). Consequently, the plaintiff will be granted recovery when
P(E)>P*(B)>0.5, which further secures the defendant's reliance on the ex ante probability of breach.
50. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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Another liability scenario, in which C would be liable only if the fence
was ill-constructed or otherwise defective, is less trivial. In that scenario,
which is reminiscent of product liability, H could be entitled to Cs
precautions even when the risk of damage equals 5 %. If this entitlement
is properly established, it would tell C, both before and after the event, "H
is entitled to your precautions also against risks as low as 5 %." By its
very definition, this entitlement was visible ex ante. It required C either
to take the appropriate precautions or to let the damage happen and then
pay for it. This entitlement would then have been conferred on H for
presumptively good reasons: damage associated with falling fences can be
serious and the costs of its prevention are usually not exorbitant.5 ' The
entitlement therefore overrides the originally low chance of the fence's
collapse. This low chance did not erode H's entitlement to Cs
precautions, as could happen, for example, under the negligence regime.
The key issue must therefore be formulated as follows: Did C take the
adequate precautions to prevent the fence's collapse? H contends that C
did not take them, and the ex post probability of this allegation equals 0.6.
Admittedly, this probability is not an ex ante probability, but it is not a
pure ex post probability either. This is so because H's entitlement is both
well-established (because it is either uncontested or more probable than not)
and visible ex ante, so C knew or ought to have known about it at the time
when he built the fence. Because this entitlement extended to risks that are
as low as 5%, it dominated Cs ex ante information. This domination
upgrades the ex ante probability of breach: this probability becomes equal
to the high probability of H's entitlement.
By suppressing the product rule, this doctrinal framework also saves
substantial litigation resources. If the product rule were to apply, plaintiffs
would have to establish the discrete elements of their lawsuits at
exceedingly high levels of probability. Thus, in the example exhibiting the
conjunction paradox, the plaintiff would succeed only if the probabilities
of the contested entitlement, breach, and damage equaled approximately
0.8 each, which would drive plaintiffs into substantial litigation expenses.
By making it harder to defend against lawsuits, the doctrinal refusal to
apply the product rule apparently increases the defendants' litigation
expenses. This, however, is only partially true because the doctrine allows
potential transgressors-before they become defendants-to rely on their ex
ante information. Any potential transgressor can thus safely rely on the
51. Because the issue at hand is evidential, it must be assumed that the underlying substantive
entitlement is supported by economically sound reasons. See Postema, supra note 1, at 1396-97
(presenting and discussing Bentham's precept that "we are to judge the adequacy of a system ofjudicial
procedure not directly in terms of the Principle of Utility but rather in terms of the system's success




information reasonably available to him at the time when he contemplates
his action. The doctrine encourages him not to take on uneconomic
expenses to acquire further information that might become available at his
subsequent trial. Moreover, because the plaintiff's and the defendant's
litigation efforts are co-dependent, by inducing plaintiffs to spend less on
litigating facts, the doctrine also allows defendants to reduce their litigation
expenditures.
Therefore, contrary to the accusations against the doctrine, the
doctrine does not actually induce wasteful expenditures on accuracy ex
post. These accusations are ill-founded because they ignore the doctrinal
suppression of the product rule and its economic implications. The
doctrine does not aim at maximizing the number of correct verdicts, nor
does it aim at enhancing accuracy ex post. The doctrine effectively sets
two conditions for a lawsuit's success: the plaintiff's allegation that the
defendant violated the litigated entitlement must be more probable than not,
and the ex ante probability of the alleged violation, as determined by the
information available to the defendant at the time when he acted, must also
be preponderantly probable.5' This framework generates a suitable
second-best surrogate for the ideal proof requirement.
The analysis conducted thus far justifies the probabilistic component
of the doctrinal proof requirement as economically efficient. The winner-
takes-all principle still awaits justification, which will be provided now.
B. Proof of Damage: Efficient Awards as Affected by Drawbacks in
Enforcement
If there were no drawbacks in law enforcement, the law's formula for
optimal awards would be P(B) .d, with d denoting the average, rather than
actual, damage. But law enforcement, as we know it, does suffer from
serious drawbacks. These drawbacks must therefore be taken into account
in devising the policy for litigation awards. Ideally, violations of
deterrence-driven entitlements, including those that the law labels as
"private," should be prosecuted by the state. This point has already been
mentioned along with the cost problem that makes the state-prosecution
mechanism unattractive: indiscriminate processing of all transgressions
through this mechanism is unaffordably costly. This problem is
responsible for the fundamental law enforcement drawback: the state must
privatize the license to sue and to subsidize adjudication, which is bound
to generate inefficiencies. These inefficiencies spawn from the divergence
52. This doctrinal mechanism depends on the visibility of legal entitlements: when an entitlement
is invisible, the mechanism will not produce the desired results. In any such case, however, it is the
entitlement itself, not the evidence doctrine, that should take the blame for producing anomalies.
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between the private and the social incentives to use the adjudication
facility. 3
The privatized license to sue can be misused in two ways: it can be
utilized both insufficiently and excessively. The license will be underused,
thus failing to produce the desired social benefits, if adjudication is costly
and accrues insufficient income to private entrepreneurs. Adjudication
must therefore be subsidized, and it must also promise attractive awards to
successful plaintiffs. But the license to sue may also be overused: a
privately advantageous lawsuit may incur excessive social costs that
outweigh the adjudication's social benefits. Corrective measures that
minimize the number of both over-users and underusers of the license to
sue are, therefore, in order. I will now demonstrate that the winner-takes-
all principle is one such measurei 4
What would happen with overusers and underusers of the license to
sue, if the ideal-world formula for optimal awards-P(B)'d-were adopted
in our non-ideal litigation milieu as a replacement to the winner-takes-all
principle? The answer is obvious: both overusers and underusers of the
license to sue would increase in number. There would be more underusers
because the awards awaiting successful plaintiffs under the ideal rule are
considerably less attractive than under the winner-takes-all principle. Apart
from that, it would usually be easier for a plaintiff to prove her personal
damage than to establish the average damage figure. Under the ideal rule,
plaintiffs would therefore also have to spend more on litigation, which
would inevitably reduce the number of deserving plaintiffs. The deterrence
and other economic objectives of the law would consequently be frustrated.
The overusers' community would also grow in its number: because
any meaningful probability that attaches to a lawsuit would suffice for
recovery, more unmeritorious lawsuits would be brought and expensively
processed through adjudication. Because the multiplication principle for
conjunctive probabilities is out of use, the number of such lawsuits would,
in fact, increase most dramatically. The overuse problem would be further
exacerbated by the externalized litigation expenses: the P(B) .d rule invites
too many plaintiffs to impose litigation expenses on defendants and to eat
away the adjudication subsidy as an almost free lunch. Indeed, under the
American rule (which rejects the British "costs follow the event"
principle), a party to litigation pays only her attorney's fee, which enables
her to externalize part of the adjudication expenses upon her adversary.55
53. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive
to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 577-86 (1997).
54. For discussion of other corrective measures, see id. at 586-88.
55. See id. at 584. Note that under the P(B).d rule, a low-probability lawsuit would not be
considered "frivolous" for purposes of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
possibility of cost-shifting would therefore not deter the holders of such lawsuits.
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Overusers of the license to sue would also fail to produce the deterrence
benefits that the P(B).d rule strives to attain. Because their only interest
is to secure for themselves a profitable outcome of the venture, such
plaintiffs would settle for any profit that they-not the social welfare
principle-would consider reasonable. 6 They would thus largely accept
cheap settlement offers made by defendants. Typically, such plaintiffs
would be represented by attorneys acting on a contingent-fee basis and thus
running portfolios of cases. Those attorneys would initiate settlements at
a point in which their expected earnings from litigation equalize with their
opportunity costs (calculated as steadily growing on the hourly-fee basis).
Cheap settlements that leave wrongdoers underdeterred could consequently
be expected to mushroom.5
Largely frivolous lawsuits initiated by the overusers would also
generate some adverse selection impact or, alternatively, an additional
adjudication-cost externality. Aware of their lawsuits' frivolous nature,
and also cognizant of the ensuing judicial mistrust of all lawsuits that do
not unequivocally signal credibility, the overusers would attempt to pool
with owners of good lawsuits. The latter would consequently have to
consider an additional investment in litigation (such as gathering of more
evidence) in order to separate their lawsuits from the bad ones. Because
a lawsuit's expected returns would already be cut down for reasons given
above, this additional expenditure would turn some good lawsuits into non-
profitable actions, so that their holders would consequently prefer not to
initiate them in the first place. This market-for-lemons scenario" would,
perhaps, be too morbid for the present context: intuitively, the additional
separating investment to be made by owners of good lawsuits does not
appear to be large enough to bring the (once profitable) basic investment
in the lawsuit up to a level that wipes out the expected returns. Good
lawsuits therefore seem unlikely to be driven away from the courts. But
in this more optimistic scenario, the additional lawsuit-separating expenses
56. See id. at 581-97.
57. This point is well developed with regard to class action attorneys. See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP.
PRORS. Summer 1985, at 5, 49 (advancing the idea that the significant costs that contingent-fee lawyers
incur in litigating a case provide an incentive for early and cheap settlements); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintif's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 690 (1986) (demonstrating
that class counsel "have an incentive to settle prematurely and cheaply"). For a defense of frivolous
lawsuits, see Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability
and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 73-75 (1996) (defending frivolous lawsuits on the grounds that
standard portfolio theory urges a lawyer to take high risks with the potential for enormous awards and
to diversify risks within her caseload).
58. As famously set by George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 QUART. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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would actually be incurred. Those expenses should therefore be counted
as a harmful externality.
The winner-takes-all principle tackles these problems by branching
into two rules:
(1) the full-recovery rule, activated when the lawsuit's probability is
greater than 0.5;
(2) the zero-recovery rule that applies when the lawsuit's probability
is not greater than 0.5.
The full-recovery rule makes litigation obviously more attractive for
potential underusers of the license to sue. Under this rule, successful
plaintiffs would recover more damages than are justified by deterrence.
They would also have to prove only their personal damages, which would
usually be less expensive than establishing an impersonal average damage
as a general social fact. This would substantially increase the underusers'
expected income from litigation.
The zero-recovery rule makes litigation considerably less attractive for
potential overusers of the license to sue. Under this rule, low-probability
lawsuits are driven away from the courts. The rule also requires plaintiffs
to establish their personal damages, thus driving away personally un-
damaged plaintiffs. Finally, by raising the stakes of the average litigation,
in comparison with the ideal P(B)'d approach, this rule induces both plain-
tiffs and defendants to spend more on litigation. Instead of making this
increased investment, at least some unmeritorious plaintiffs (or, more
realistically, their contingent-fee attorneys) might consequently prefer not
to come to court.
These reasons do not only justify the winner-takes-all principle. They
also turn the probability of damage into a separate non-conjunctive factor,
thus removing it from the multiplication formula. Because damage awards
have acquired a special function in law, probability of litigated damages
also acquires a special non-conjunctive status. The task faced by
prospective plaintiffs would become considerably more onerous if proba-
bility of damage were to be processed by the product rule and multiplied
by the probabilities of breach and entitlement. This high burden of proof
would increase the number of underusers of the license to sue.
Before praising the winner-takes-all principle, however, we must look
also on the other side of the coin. Under this principle, some transgressors
(which we can label as "high-probability transgressors") are overdeterred,
while other transgressors (which we can label as "low-probability
transgressors") are underdeterred. The amount of overdeterrence (caused
by the full-recovery rule) equals D-P(B)-d, with D representing the
plaintiff's award. The amount of under-deterrence (caused by the zero-




Intuitively, this price is worth incurring in dealing with unsystematic
transgressions. When incurred sporadically, this price is unlikely to exceed
the costs associated with applying the P(B)'d rule. But if the price is
incurred systematically, as would happen in recurring transgression cases,
then the opposite would be true. The winner-takes-all principle would
defeat the deterrence objective of the law if a low-probability transgressor
could repeat his conduct time and time again (theoretically, ad infinitum)
without being penalized. The deterrence objective would also be defeated
if a high probability transgressor were to gain nothing from taking
precautions that reduce the transgression's probability but still keep it
above the level of 0.5. In such settings, prominently exemplified by
market-share liability in torts, 59 a strong case can be made for substituting
the winner-takes-all principle with the P(B).d rule.'
V. An Implication for Punitive Damages
The winner-takes-all principle has an important policy implication for
punitive damages in torts. From the deterrence perspective, punitive
damages are an important policy instrument: they can be utilized as an
award-correcting tool by a legal system that suffers from drawbacks in law
enforcement. Drawbacks in law enforcement dilute deterrence. Imposition
of punitive damages can raise the level of deterrence back to the optimal
and thereby counteract this dilution. Law-enforcement drawbacks would
consequently be offset by punitive damages. This possibility is econ-
omically attractive because elimination of law-enforcement drawbacks is
usually expensive. In contrast, fixing punitive damages only requires an
informed decision, so it is relatively cheap.
In making such decisions, legislators and judges must account for the
punitive aspect of the winner-takes-all principle. By forcing defendants to
pay increased compensation in order to increase the number of socially
beneficial lawsuits and thereby counteract the potential underenforcement
of the law, the winner-takes-all principle performs an essentially punitive
function. Under this principle, the defendants' overpayment equals (1-
P)-D, when P is the probability of the plaintiff's case and D is the relevant
59. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 933-35 (Cal. 1980).
60. See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 691, 697-98 & 698 n.13 (1990). Arguments favoring this substitution can be put on a more
principled footing. Many instances that involve low-probability transgressors are instances in which
the transgression is preponderantly responsible for the factual uncertainty of the case. This is certainly
true about all repeated-transgression cases. In such cases, transgressors should be made liable for the
resulting evidential damage, measured by the plaintiff's lost chances to prevail at her trial with the help
of the evidence of which she was wrongfully deprived. The evidential damage doctrine also optimizes
the incentives for high probability transgressors. See Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for
Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 1891, 1940 (1997).
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damage. This overpayment must be treated as a punitive ingredient of trial
awards because it intensifies general deterrence at the expense of the
individual defendant. If so, then (1-P).D is the sum by which punitive
damages must be reduced whenever they are explicitly imposed by courts.
Punitive damages must therefore be calculated in the following
way." In a trial for damage D, let q denote the defendant's ex ante
probability of being subjected to law enforcement. The defendant's ex ante
probability of escaping law enforcement would thus equal 1-q. The odds
of escape vs. enforcement ("the enforcement odds") would accordingly be
(1-q)/q. The total damage award, including both actual and punitive
damages, would amount to 1/q-D=D/q (1/q functions here as an award
multiplier that compensates for the liability-escaping chances, thus bringing
the award to the optimal level of deterrence). The award's punitive part
would consequently equal (D/q)-D, that is, [(1-q)/q]-D (the non-punitive
award multiplied by the enforcement odds). As already mentioned, the
punitive ingredient of the full-recovery rule is (1-P).D. The optimal
punitive award should therefore amount to D-[(1-q)/q-(1-P)] (the non-
punitive award multiplied by the difference between the enforcement odds
and the probability of non-breach).
VI. Conclusion
This essay has offered a new rationale for the existing proof
requirements in civil trials. The civil proof doctrine, as traditionally
understood, aims at maximizing the accuracy of judicial verdicts.
Understood in this way, the doctrine exhibits two economic paradoxes.
First, it focuses upon accuracy ex post by requiring judges to reconstruct
the relevant events, as unfolded in reality, including the damage actually
sustained by the plaintiff, on the basis of information that becomes
available at trial. On the basis of that information judges are called upon
to determine the probability of the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant
violated the litigated entitlement and that the plaintiff has sustained the
litigated damage as a result of the violation. This type of accuracy is
economically inefficient. Accuracy ex post is a waste when information
available at trial is not the same information that could be cost-efficiently
obtained by the defendant before taking the litigated action. For deterrence
purposes, it is only the latter type of information that matters. Moreover,
accuracy ex post is an investment-dependent opportunity rather than a static
good. As such, it fosters a secondary market for competitive adversarial
61. As developed by A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REv. 870 (1998). See also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive




investments in information, which might adversely affect the primary
market, that is, the market for goods, services, risks, and precautions.
Thus, when prospective litigants are rationally unwilling to commit
themselves to the required investments in information, inefficiencies are
bound to occur. In such cases, each party will account for the event that
he will be wrongfully defeated in the future trial because his opponent's
investment in information outscored his. This prospect will foil trans-
actions that are otherwise efficient and chill many other socially beneficial
activities.
Second, if the doctrine is nonetheless committed to accuracy ex post,
then it should require judges to determine the ultimate probability of the
plaintiff's case by multiplying the probabilities that attach to the relevant
entitlement, breach and damage. By refusing to apply the multiplication
principle, the doctrine, in fact, reduces the total amount of correct verdicts,
instead of maximizing it. The doctrine therefore seems to be doing the
wrong thing in the wrong way, even though the thing and the way both
have a strong intuitive appeal.
The traditional theory, however, is neither necessary nor most
plausible: under the new theory offered by this essay, the two alleged
wrongs make a right because in combination they generate a synergetic
mechanism that aligns, to the extent feasible, the ex ante and the ex post
probabilities of transgression. This alignment is attained by the combined,
but not conjunctive, functioning of the two probabilities: the probability of
the litigated entitlement and the ex post probability of the entitlement's
breach. The entitlement's probability dominates the defendant's ex ante
information, thus adjusting the ex ante probability of breach. This
adjustment is achieved due to the visibility element, uniformly featured by
legal entitlements: under the definition of virtually any entitlement, the
entitlement must both exist and be reasonably ascertainable ex ante, that is,
at the time and in the circumstances of its breach. The ex post probability
of breach has a different function, namely, to substantiate the allegation
that the defendant has actually violated the entitlement. This combined
framework secures the appropriate alignment between the ex post and the
ex ante probabilities of breach. The plaintiff will prevail at trial only when
each probability is preponderant, so prospective defendants can safely rely
on the probabilities of breach that exist ex ante. Indeed, because the
entitlement's probability functions as a misalignment-corrector for the ex
post probability of breach, and not as its conjunctive companion, the two
probabilities must not be multiplied in determining the ultimate probability
of the plaintiff's case.
This doctrinal mechanism also saves litigation expenses. The
plaintiffs' litigation effort is substantially alleviated by the doctrinal refusal
to apply the multiplication principle. This entails greater hardship for
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defendants, but they receive offsetting benefits: the doctrine allows
potential transgressors-before they become defendants-to rely on their ex
ante information. The doctrine thus encourages potential transgressors not
to undertake uneconomic expenses by acquiring further information that
might become available at their subsequent trials.
The essay also supports the existing award system, under which, as a
matter of general rule, the winner takes all. The essay justifies this system
by the existing constraints in law enforcement. Under those constraints,
the legal system employs the winner-takes-all principle to reduce the
number of underusers and overusers of the adjudication facility, which is
both privatized and subsidized by the state. This rationale turns trial
awards into a discrete component of civil litigation. The doctrinal
mechanism exposed in this essay consequently separates the breach-related
from the damage-related proof requirements. Probability of the litigated
damage must therefore also be removed from the multiplication formula.
There is, consequently, no room for applying the multiplication principle:
the conjunction paradox disappears because all the relevant probabilities are
functionally non-conjunctive.
The essay has compared this doctrinal mechanism with the ideal proof
requirement, as derived from the optimal deterrence standard. I have done
this by using a simple Bayesian model that explores the interrelationship
between three pivotal probability factors: probability of entitlement,
probability of breach, and probability of damage. This formalization has
proved useful: under the constructed first-best model, allocation of liability
in civil trials ought to be determined by the ex ante probability of breach
as a non-conjunctive monadic probability. Unfortunately, due to various
constraints, determination of this probability cannot feasibly be attained in
adjudication (ex post). The legal system must therefore search for a
suitable surrogate for that probability. This essay has identified the
required surrogate in the existing doctrinal mechanism. This mechanism
is therefore justified as a second-best.
The winner-takes-all principle is the only doctrinal component that
deviates from the ideal model. This finding is not surprising because the
model was constructed as an ideal type and was thus isolated from the
existing drawbacks in the administration of justice. As explained in the
essay, these drawbacks call for corrective measures, and the winner-takes-
all principle is one of those measures. This understanding of the winner-
takes-all principle calls for an appropriate adjustment of punitive damages
when these are awarded on economic grounds. The essay consequently
offers the required adjustment.
Readers of this essay can also deduce from it a more general lesson.
This essay unfolds an explanatory theory that instantiates the general
economic theory of second-best. This general theory holds that finding an
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economic distortion is not yet a good reason for eliminating it: the
observed distortion may be counteracting another distortion that the
relevant social mechanism, such as law, must accommodate because of
some of its intrinsic constraints.62  This possibility calls for a
comprehensive assessment of the mechanism's components, including the
incentives that these components mutually produce and the constraints
under which they operate. As demonstrated by this essay, the "second-
best" methodology is particularly suitable for analyzing common-law
doctrines, such as those that judges collectively develop to facilitate proof
of facts in adjudication. Those doctrines are presumptively efficient
because they have been thought through by many judges as a means for
resolving future cases and for shaping people's future behavior.63
Therefore, prior to denouncing a common law doctrine that appears
inefficient, one should examine its possible role in offsetting another
ostensible distortion in a comprehensive second-best mechanism.' 4
62. See Smith, supra note 27, at 695 (citing Richard G. Lipsey & KelPin Lancaster, The General
Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956-57)) (offering a general economic theory of
second-best).
63. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 27-28.
64. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 271, 274-75 (stating that while the "common law is to most
lawyers a collection of disparate fields, each with its own history, vocabulary, and bewildering
profusion of rules and doctrines," those doctrines "form a system for inducing people to behave
efficiently," and although "[tiheir articulation in economic terms is beyond the capacity of most judges
and lawyers .... their intuition is not").
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